Can ‘dramatically different cognitive styles’ explain tea partiers’ rage?
By Joshua Holland, Moyers & CompanyThursday, October 31, 2013 8:16 EDT
A growing body of research
suggests that we are a nation divided not only by partisanship or how we
view various issues, but also by dramatically different cognitive
styles. Sociologists and psychologists are getting a better
understanding about the ways that deep seated emotional responses effect
our ideological viewpoints.
Last week, Moyers & Company caught up with Mother Jones science writer Chris Mooney, host of the Inquiring Minds podcast and author of The Republican Brain: the Science of Why They Deny Science – and Reality, to talk about what this research may tell us about the attitudes of those involved in the tea party movement. Below is a lightly-edited transcript of our discussion.
Joshua Holland: Chris,
let’s talk about morality. I’m personally offended by the tea partiers’
resistance to giving uninsured people health care. I find it a bit
shocking that a political movement could be so filled with animosity
toward the idea. But according to NYU social psychologist Jonathan Haidt
— and other scholars — conservatives have a different moral compass
entirely. Can you tell us a little bit about that?
Chris Mooney:
Absolutely. There are many people doing research in the psychology of
politics. Jonathan Haidt is a pioneer in the psychology of morality and
how that feeds into politics, and it really helps with something like
this where you have strong emotional passions that are irreconcilable on
the left and the right.
So what you’re describing is
his moral foundation of “harm,” which liberals tend to feel more
strongly about. These are emotions relating to empathy and compassion –
measured by the question of how much someone is suffering and how much
that suffering is a moral issue to you. How much is caring for the weak
and vulnerable a moral issue to you?
It’s
not that conservatives don’t feel that emotion, but they don’t
necessarily feel it as strongly. They feel other things more strongly.
So to Haidt, this explains the health care
debate because liberals feel, most of all, this harm-care-compassion
thing. Conservatives feel it a little bit less strongly, even as they
have this other morality. Haidt compares it to karma — it’s really
interesting — where basically, you’re supposed to get what you deserve.
And what really bothers them is somebody not getting what they deserve.
So the government getting involved and interfering with people getting what they deserve is really bad. That, I think, is the clash.
Holland: Jared Piazza —
a scholar at the University of Pennsylvania — did a study which found
that political and religious conservatives tend to avoid what he called
‘consequentialist thinking.’ So basically, they tend to see something as
right or a wrong, in black and white, and if a policy that they believe
to be right — say, not having the government get involved in health
care — causes real world harm, they’re more likely to dismiss that. That
seems consistent with what Haidt is saying, right?
Mooney: Sure.
Part of his whole theory is that you feel these views before you think
these views, and then you rationalize your beliefs.
Now, he would say that both
sides do it. But it’s actually an open debate whether one side does it
more. But certainly, if conservatives have reached a position for moral
reasons, are they then more likely to discount evidence suggesting some
problem with their position? Absolutely. They’re also more likely to
take whatever evidence there is out there and twist it so that it
supports their view. And, the more intelligent ones will be better at
doing that. [laughs] That’s what all the research shows.
Holland: Right. And it
all seems fairly consistent to me. I’ve interviewed George Lakoff at UC
Berkeley. He talks about how people don’t judge a political issue on
its merits, but tend to filter the world through a moral lens. He talks
about a “moral cascade,” where we connect policies with deep-seated
values. All of this research seems to be very consistent with what other
people are doing.
Mooney:
That’s right. And you wouldn’t want to believe it if it were just one
paper in just one journal by just one researcher. That’s what, as a
science writer, we’re skeptical of. We look for multiple people working
in multiple fields all converging and then we say, ‘okay, there’s
knowledge here,’ something reliable is being discovered. With the
psychology of politics – the psychology of ideology — it is actually
surprising how rapidly all of this knowledge has come together. I don’t
think we’re completely there yet, but I think that you can’t miss the
fact that there are huge commonalities between Lakoff, Haidt and a lot
of other people that we haven’t mentioned who are doing research in this
same field.
Holland: Let’s dig a bit deeper into Haidt’s moral foundation theory. In your Mother Jones interview with Haidt
you have a graph comparing how liberals, conservatives, and then also
libertarians score on what Haidt calls the “seven moral foundations.”
And when you look at
the graph, the biggest disparities between liberals and conservatives —
and, again, libertarians — are “purity” and “authority.” That’s where
you see the biggest gaps between the groups. What is purity in Haidt’s
reckoning?
Mooney:
Purity is basically whether you feel moral emotions when someone does
something you view as disgusting or indecent. A lot of this is going to
involve your judgments about what’s sexually proper, but it could be
other things that are disgusting. Basically, this is a way of measuring
the emotion of disgust, and what this shows — this is the most striking
disparity of all of them — is that liberals and libertarians really
don’t sense disgust very much. And they’re together on that completely.
There’s an amazing number of things that liberals and libertarians are
together on. But conservatives feel it much more than either of them.
And so this can explain a great deal in politics — it’s most regularly
invoked to explain gay rights and how people respond to that, which I
think is very appropriate. But I think it also gets into a lot of
bioethical issues.
Holland: And we’ve
discussed authority before. That’s really central to understanding the
conservative mindset. There’s been a lot of research on the so-called
authoritarian personality type, and I want to connect this with the idea
of political polarization.
One of the things that
we understand about authoritarians is that they have a stronger sense
of the importance of loyalty to one’s own in-group. How does that factor
into this equation, do you think?
Mooney:
Again, this is an area where liberals and libertarians differ from
conservatives markedly. Liberals and libertarians aren’t particularly
tribal in the sense of having loyalty to their group, and they aren’t
particularly authoritarian in the sense of thinking you have to follow a
strong leader. And basically, authoritarianism is also associated with
sort of black and white, ‘you’re with me or you’re against me’ thinking.
But it’s also about deference to authority, whether that’s the police
officer or your father or God. You must obey authority and if you don’t,
that’s a moral wrong.
Holland: Jonathan
Weiler at the University of North Carolina did a study which found that
you can predict a person’s ideological leanings by how they answered
just a few questions about child rearing. And one of the questions was
whether someone values obedience or creativity more in a child. It’s
really — it’s telling stuff.
Mooney: Yeah,
this is another way of measuring authoritarianism, because the theory
is — and it seems pretty sound to me — that if you’re an authoritarian,
one of the places it’s going to come out is in how you view child
rearing. That is a situation in which the parent has to exert some level
of authority, but parents interpret that differently. And if someone
interprets parenting as sort of a strict father model — you need to obey
the rules — then that’s an authoritarian style of parenting. So he’s
just saying, ‘let’s ask about parenting and we’ll figure out who our
authoritarians are,’ and what’s good about that as a scientific method
is that you’re not actually asking anything that seems politically
tinged. You could be confounding your variables if people get the sense
that you’re asking them something political, but that’s not the case
here — you’re just asking about parenting. That’s what’s nice about it.
Holland: Now, George Lakoff says
that our brains have both liberal and conservative moral circuits — if
you will — neural pathways. And when one set gets activated again and
again it grows stronger and the other set becomes weaker. How does Fox
and the right wing blogs and the whole conservative media bubble play
into this pattern of polarization, if we accept Lakoff’s argument?
Mooney:
Right, and I don’t think Lakoff would be necessarily inconsistent with
others here. You’re reinforcing a circuit in the brain, so to speak, and
the more it’s used the more powerful it becomes and the more it becomes
habitual to use
it. I think it’s a very different thing, but if you just think about
how if you’re a musician, and you practice the guitar every day, then
basically you wire your brain to have a certain aptitude, and every time
you pick up the instrument, you’re going to be just as good. But if you
then don’t practice for a year, you pick it up, and boy, some things
are still going to be there, but some things are going to be lost. If
you reinforce these political/emotional circuits, it’s a similar effect.
The more you use it, the more it becomes part of you.
So what this is getting at is
that the brain is plastic to a certain extent, but at the same time, a
lot of the research suggests that there’s something very deep about
political differences. So you’re probably predisposed to feel a certain
way, but then if you reinforce the circuit you can strengthen that, or
if your life experiences take you in a different direction, it can
weaken those views.
Holland: You spoke
earlier about how we all have a tendency to marshal evidence that
confirms our previously held worldview and reject evidence that
contradicts it — this is known as motivated reasoning. Is that something
that both liberals and conservatives do to a similar degree, or do we
see differences in this area?
Mooney:
There’s no doubt that both do it. All the studies show that. And this is
a debated issue right know — whether there’s asymmetry or not. I can
point you to a number of papers that seem to suggest some sort of
asymmetry. But there are researchers who are not convinced, and there
are some papers that don’t show asymmetry. So it’s a big debate and it
depends largely upon what kind of evidence you buy.
I would expect you to have
asymmetry. I would at least expect that on those issues where
conservatives have a stronger moral sense, say about an in-group thing, I
would expect their emotionally motivated response to be stronger just
because they’re feeling this more strongly. So I would certainly expect
more response in one of those areas where just generally it’s something
they feel more strongly about. That doesn’t seem like a hard thing to
assume.
But an interesting question is
this: if you get something that liberals feel really strongly about,
something about equality or something about harm, are they equally
biased? And I think that we still need more research on this, but I’m
suspecting that we’re going to see real differences. And I think that
there’s some evidence which points that way already.
Holland: One of the
things that I think does point that way is the tendency of people with
authoritarian personalities to be really sensitive to cognitive
dissonance. That would seem to lead to a more fervent desire to ignore
contradictory evidence that causes kind of a psychic pain, if you will.
Mooney:
Right. There was the recent study — and this can show you both why I
suspect you’re right, but also why these researchers are unsure — there
was a recent study that actually showed that conservatives were less
willing to entertain cognitive dissonance than liberals were. It was by
some political psychologists at NYU, and what they did was they asked
people, ‘would you be willing to write an essay talking about how the president you dislike did a good job?’ So in other words, would liberals write an essay on the good things about George W. Bush
and would conservatives write an essay on good things about Barack
Obama—and the liberals were more willing to write that essay. It
required them to entertain cognitive dissonance for a time.
But what’s difficult when you
break it down is this: what if liberals just don’t hate George W. Bush
as much as conservatives hate Barack Obama? I mean, what if the emotions
are not as raw anymore? After all, a lot of time has passed. What if
this isn’t the perfect apples to apples comparison? And that’s why these
kinds of studies are hard to conduct.
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