One Country Saved Its Jews. Were They Just Better People? The surprising truth about Denmark in the Holocaust
This magnificent book
states its central argument in its title. Danish Jews survived Hitler’s
rule in World War II, when other European Jews did not, because Danes
regarded their Jewish neighbors as countrymen. There was no “us” and
“them;” there was just us.
When, in October 1943, the
Gestapo came to round up the 7,500 Jews of Copenhagen, the Danish police
did not help them to smash down the doors. The churches read letters of
protest to their congregations. Neighbors helped families to flee to
villages on the Baltic coast, where local people gave them shelter in
churches, basements, and holiday houses and local fishermen loaded up
their boats and landed them safely in neutral Sweden. Bo Lidegaard, the
editor of the leading Danish newspaper Politiken, has retold
this story using astonishingly vivid unpublished material from families
who escaped, and the testimony of contemporary eyewitnesses, senior
Danish leaders (including the king himself), and even the Germans who
ordered the roundups. The result is an intensely human account of one
episode in the persecution of European Jews that ended in survival.
The
story may have ended well, but it is a complex tale. The central
ambiguity is that the Germans warned the Jews and let most of them
escape. Lidegaard claims this was because the Danes refused to help the
Germans, but the causation might also have worked in the other
direction. It was when the Danes realized that the Germans were letting
some Jews go that they found the courage to help the rest of their
Jewish community escape. Countrymen is a fascinating study in the ambiguity of virtue.
The
Danes knew long before the war that their army could not resist a
German invasion. Instead of overtly criticizing Hitler, the Social
Democratic governments of the 1930s sought to inoculate their
populations against the racist ideology next door. It was in those
ominous years that the shared identity of all Danes as democratic
citizens was drummed into the political culture, just in time to render
most Danes deeply resistant to the Nazi claim that there existed a
“Jewish problem” in Denmark. Lidegaard’s central insight is that human
solidarity in crisis depended on the prior consolidation of a decent
politics, on the creation of a shared political imagination. Some Danes
did harbor anti-Semitic feelings, but even they understood the Jews to
be members of a political community, and so any attack on them was an
attack on the Danish nation as such.
The nation in
question was imagined in civic terms rather than ethnic terms. What
mattered was a shared commitment to democracy and law, not a common race
or religion. We can see this in the fact that Danish citizens did not
defend several hundred communists who were interned and deported by the
Danish government for denouncing the Danish monarchy and supporting the
Hitler-Stalin pact. The Danes did nothing to defend their own
communists, but they did stand up for the Jews.
The
Danish response to the Nazis illuminates a crucial fact about the
Holocaust: the Germans did not always force the issue of extermination
where they faced determined resistance from occupied populations. In
Bulgaria, as Tzvetan Todorov has shown in his aptly titled book The Fragility of Goodness,
the Jews were saved because the king of Bulgaria, the Orthodox Church,
and a few key Bulgarian politicians refused to assist the German
occupiers. Why did a similar civic sense of solidarity not take root in
other countries? In Holland, why did 80 percent of Dutch Jews perish?
And what about France: why did liberty, equality, and fraternity not
apply to the citizens driven from their homes by French police and sent
to deportation and death? These questions become harder to answer in the
light of the Danish and Bulgarian counterexamples. One possible
explanation is that the German occupation’s presence in Denmark was
lighter than in either France or Holland. The Danes, like the
Bulgarians, kept their king and maintained their own government
throughout the occupation. Self-government gave them a capacity to
defend Jews that was never possible in the occupied zones of France or
Holland.
Both the Danish king and the Danish government
decided that their best hope of maintaining Denmark’s sovereignty lay
in cooperating but not collaborating with the German occupiers. This
“cooperation” profited some Danes but shamed many others. The Danish
population harbored ancestral hostility to the Germans, and the
occupation reinforced these feelings. The Germans, for their part, put
up with this frigid relationship: they needed Danish food, and Danish
cooperation freed up German military resources for battle on the Eastern
Front, and the Nazis wanted to be liked. They wanted their
“cooperative” relationship with Denmark to serve as a model for a future
European community under Hitler’s domination.
From
very early on in this ambiguous relationship, the Danes, from the king
on down, made it clear that harming the Jews would bring cooperation to
an end and force the Germans to occupy the country altogether. The king
famously told his prime minister, in private, that if the Germans forced
the Danish Jews to wear a yellow star, then he would wear one too. Word
of the royal position went public and even led to a myth that the king
had actually ridden through the streets of Copenhagen on horseback
wearing a yellow star on his uniform. The king never did wear a star. He
didn’t have to wear one, because, thanks to his opposition, the Germans
never imposed such a regulation in Denmark.
When,
in late summer in 1943, the order came down from Eichmann to the local
German authorities in Copenhagen that they had to rid the city of its
Jews, these authorities faced a dilemma. They knew that the Danish
politicians, police, and media—that Danish society as a whole—would
resist and that, once the cooperation of the Danes had been lost, the
Germans would have to run the country themselves. The Germans in
Copenhagen were also beginning to have second thoughts about the war
itself. By then the German armies had been defeated at Stalingrad. While
the Gestapo in Poland and Eastern Europe faced the prospect of defeat
by accelerating the infernal rhythm of extermination in the death camps,
the Gestapo in Denmark began to look for a way out. The local Gauleiter,
a conniving opportunist named Werner Best, did launch the roundup of
the Jews, but only after letting the Jewish community find out in
advance what was coming, giving them time to escape. He did get his
hands on some people in an old-age home and dispatch them to
Theresienstadt, but all but 1 percent of the Jewish community escaped
his clutches. It is an astonishing number.
When
Adolf Eichmann came to Copenhagen in 1943 to find out why so many Jews
had escaped, he did not cashier the local Gestapo. Instead he backed
down and called off the deportations of Danes who were half-Jewish or
married to Jews. Lidegaard’s explanation for Eichmann’s volte face
is simply that the institutions of Danish society all refused to go
along. And without their cooperation, a Final Solution in Denmark became
impossible. Totalitarianism, not to mention ethnic cleansing and ethnic
extermination, always requires a great deal of collaboration.
When
they got wind of German plans in September 1943, the Danish government
resigned, and no politician agreed to serve in a collaborationist
government with the Germans thereafter. After the roundups of Jews were
announced, leading Danish politicians of different parties issued a
joint statement declaring, “The Danish Jews are an integral part of the
people, and therefore all the people are deeply affected by the measures
taken, which are seen as a violation of the Danish sense of justice.”
This is the political culture of “countrymen” with which Lidegaard
explains the extraordinary determination—and success—of the Danes in
protecting their Jewish population.
Such general
support across Danish society seems to have empowered the Jews of
Copenhagen. When the Gestapo came to search the Jewish community’s
offices in September 1943, the community treasurer, Axel Hertz, did not
hesitate to ask the intruders, “By what right do you come here?” The
German in charge replied, quite candidly: “By the right of the
stronger.” And Hertz retorted: “That is no good right.” Jews in Denmark
behaved like rights-bearers, not like victims in search of compassion.
And they were not wrong: their feeling of membership in the Danish
polity had a basis in its political culture.
When the
Germans arrived to begin the deportations, Jews had already been
warned—in their synagogues—and they simply vanished into the
countryside, heading for the coast to seek a crossing to neutral Sweden.
There was little or no Jewish communal organization and no Danish
underground to help them. What ensued was a chaotic family-by-family
flight, made possible simply because ordinary members of Danish society
feigned ignorance when Germans questioned them, while sheltering
families in seaside villages, hotels, and country cottages. Danish
police on the coast warned hiding families when the Gestapo came to
call, and signaled all-clear so that boats bearing Danish Jews could
slip away to Sweden. The fishermen who took the Danish Jews across the
Baltic demanded huge sums for the crossing, but managed to get their
frightened fellow citizens to safety. When the Gestapo did seize Jewish
families hiding in the church of the small fishing village of Gilleleje,
the people were so outraged that they banded together to assist others
to flee. One villager even confronted the local Gestapo officer, shining
a flashlight in his face and exclaiming: “The poor Jews!” When the
German replied, “It is written in the Bible that this shall be their
fate,” the villager unforgettably replied: “But it is not written that
it has to happen in Gilleleje.”
Why
did the Danes behave so differently from most other societies and
populations in occupied Europe? For a start, they were the only nation
where escape to a safe neutral country lay across a narrow strait of
water. Moreover, they were not subject to exterminatory pressure
themselves. They were not directly occupied, and their leadership
structures from the monarch down to the local mayors were not ripped
apart. The newspapers in Copenhagen were free enough to report the
deportations and thus to assist any Jews still not in the know to flee.
The relatively free circulation of information also made it impossible
for non-Jewish Danes to claim, as so many Germans did, that “of this
we had no knowledge.”
Most
of all, Denmark was a small, homogeneous society, with a stable
democracy, a monarchy that commanded respect, and a shared national
hostility to the Germans. Denmark offers some confirmation of Rousseau’s
observation that virtue is most easily fostered in small republics.
Lidegaard
is an excellent guide to this story when he sticks close to Danish
realities. When he ventures further and asks bigger questions, he goes
astray. At the end of his book he asks: “Are human beings fundamentally
good but weak? Or are we brutal by nature, checked and controlled only
by civilization?” He wants the Danish story to answer such questions,
but it cannot bear such weight. There simply are no general answers to
the question of why humans behave as they do in times of extremity. What
Lidegaard’s story really demonstrates is that history and context are
all. Denmark was Denmark: that is all one can truthfully say.
Lidegaard
makes the argument, in his conclusion, that had resistance been as
strong elsewhere in Europe as it was in Denmark, the Nazis might never
have been able to drive the Final Solution to its conclusion. He writes:
Hatred of the different was not some primordial force that was unleashed. Rather, it was a political convenience that could be used as needed, and in most occupied territories the Nazis followed their interests in pursuing this with disastrous consequences. But without a sounding board the strategy did not work. It could be countered by simple means—even by a country that was defenseless and occupied—by the persistent national rejection of the assumption that there was a “Jewish problem.”
This
strikes me as only half-right. Anti-Semitism was indeed not “a
primordial force” that the Nazis simply tapped into wherever they
conquered. Jews met different fates in each country the Nazis
occupied—or at least the rates of destruction and escape varied. But it
does not follow that what the Danes did other peoples could have also
done. The Germans faced resistance of varying degrees of ferocity in
every country that they occupied in Europe. Where they possessed the
military and police power to do so, they crushed that resistance with
unbridled cruelty. Where, as in Denmark, they attempted a strategy of
indirect rule, they had to live with the consequences: a populace that
could not be terrorized into doing their bidding, and could therefore be
counted on to react when fellow citizens were arrested and carried
away.
One uncomfortable possibility that Lidegaard does
not explore is that the Nazis sought a strategy of indirect rule
precisely because they saw the Danes as fellow Aryans, potential allies
in an Aryan Europe. This would explain why the Nazis were so comfortable
in Copenhagen and so shaken by Danish resistance. The Poles they could
dismiss as Untermenschen, and the French as ancient enemies;
but to be resisted by supposed Aryans was perversely disarming. Why else
would a ferocious bureaucrat such as Eichmann melt before Danish
objections to the arrest of Jews married to Danes? One paradoxical
possibility is that the Nazis bowed to Danish protests because their
delusional racial anthropology led them to view the Danes as members of
their own family. To their eternal credit, the Danes exploited this
imagined family resemblance to defy an act of infamy.
Countrymen
is a story about a little country that did the right thing for
complicated reasons, and got away with it for equally complicated
reasons. It is a story that reinforces an old truth: solidarity and
decency depend on a dense tissue of connection among people, on
long-formed habits of the heart, on resilient cultures of common
citizenship, and on leaders who marshal these virtues by their example.
In Denmark, this dense tissue bound human beings together and indirect
rule made it impossible for the Germans to rip it apart. Elsewhere in
Europe, by contrast, it was destroyed in stages, first by ghettoizing
and isolating the Jewish people and then by insulating bystanders from
the full horror of Nazi intentions. Once Jews had been stripped of
citizenship, property, rights, and social existence—once they could
appeal only to the common humanity of persecutors and bystanders
alike—it was too late.
There is a sobering message in
Lidegaard’s tale for the human rights era that came after these
abominations. If a people come to rely for their protection on human
rights alone, on the mutual recognition of common humanity, they are
already in serious danger. The Danish story seems to tell us that it is
not the universal human chain that binds peoples together in extremity,
but more local and granular ties: the particular consciousness of time,
place, and heritage that led a Danish villager to stand up to the
Gestapo and say no, it will not happen here, not in our village. This
extraordinary story of one small country has resonance beyond its Danish
context. Countrymen should be read by anyone seeking to
understand what precise set of shared social and political
understandings can make possible, in times of terrible darkness, acts of
civil courage and uncommon decency.
Michael
Ignatieff teaches at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University and at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto.
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