As
the government shutdown neared its end, an NBC/Esquire poll appeared
trying to promote the idea of “New American Center.” Salon’s own Alex
Pareene
rather mercilessly, for various good reasons, not least of which was
how the whole enterprise came off: “It seems like marketing for NBC and
Esquire — we represent the sensible (and probably affluent) center!
Don’t be scared of our political content, advertisers!” Pareene wrote.
But there was more: “[I]t is clearly very psychically important to the
elite political media that a reasonable center exist. A common-sense,
centrist middle is an essential, foundational myth of the nonpartisan
press.
in 1996, today’s elite media also thrives on superficial coverage of
controvery, which makes it complicit in generating the very extremism it
simultaneous deplores, condemns and needs to hold at bay in order to
legitimate itself.
With such a profoundly self-contradictory practice, it should not surprise us that the poll was even
misleading than Pareene described. Polarization in some sense is real —
and yet also partial, misleading and embedded in consensus as well. Tea
Partyers ranting “Keep the government’s hands off my Medicare!” may
seem comical — but they also show just how broad a true consensus can
be. In fact, they reflect
central (but routinely ignored)
facts of American public opinion that have remained remarkably stable
since the 1960s, despite all that’s changed since then:
These two facts are both in full force
with respect to the ongoing post-shutdown budget battle. In fact, a
sophisticated poll covering 31 budget items as well as revenue sources
conducted around the 2010 elections found that, even then, Republican,
Democratic and independent voters all agreed on much higher taxes and
much deeper defense cuts as the most striking elements of how the budget
should be crafted. But before we examine that poll, we need to put
these two key facts into long-term context.
The
first clear picture of this situation came from two pioneers of public
opinion research, Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril, in their 1967 book,
“The Political Beliefs of Americans,” based on surveys conducted in 1964
. Their most striking finding was profoundly paradoxical: While half the population qualified as
ideological conservatives, based on questions about government interference and individual initiative, two-thirds of the population were
operationally liberal,
supporting an activist federal government when asked about specific
programs or responsibilities — stable or increased federal government
spending on education, housing and urban renewal, adoption of Johnson’s
Medicare proposal, and government responsibility to fight poverty.
In
short, the American people were in some sense schizoid — opposed to big
government in principle, but even more supportive of it in practice.
Most strikingly, almost one-quarter of the population — 23 percent —
were both ideological conservatives and operational liberals, and this
figure skyrocketed to 46 percent in the Deep South states that Goldwater
carried in the 1964 election.
In the final section of the final
chapter of the book, titled “The Need for a Restatement of American
Ideology,” Free and Cantril wrote:
The paradox of a
large majority of Americans qualifying as operational liberals while at
the same time a majority hold to a conservative ideology has been
repeatedly emphasized in this study. We have described this state of
affairs as mildly schizoid, with people believing in one set of
principles abstractly while acting according to another set of
principles in their political behavior. But the principles according to
which the majority of Americans actually behave politically have not yet
been adequately formulated in modern terms …
There is little
doubt that the time has come for a restatement of American ideology to
bring it in line with what the great majority of people want and
approve. Such a statement, with the right symbols incorporated, would
focus people’s wants, hopes, and beliefs, and provide a guide and
platform to enable the American people to implement their political
desires in a more intelligent, direct, and consistent manner.
Of
course, such a restatement never happened. To the contrary, the white
backlash to advancing civil rights provided a framework for sharply
increased attacks on “big government,” which liberals were increasingly
reluctant to defend unreservedly. And yet, despite the far more strident
conservative tone of political discourse since then, support for
government spending has varied somewhat cyclically since then, but only
within a relatively narrow range, as recorded by the gold standard of
public opinion research, the
General Social Survey [data archives
here].
The
GSS asks about more than two dozen specific problems or program areas,
asking if the amount we’re spending is “too little,” “too much” or
“about right.” Not only do most Americans think we’re spending too
little in almost every area — most conservatives also think the same.
Indeed — hold onto your hats — even most
conservative Republicans feel that way as well.
Take
Social Security and Medicare, for example: two top “entitlements” that
Republicans insist must be cut significantly, and that Obama has
repeatedly indicated he would cut … if Republicans would agree to raise
revenues as well. Progressives long have argued that these programs
need more revenues,
not less spending, so it’s not surprising
that liberals surveyed by the GSS think we’re spending too little on
such programs. Combining GSS data from 2000 to 2012, and asking about
Social Security and spending on “improving and protecting the nation’s
health” (GSS’s closest match with Medicare), liberal Democrats thought
we were spending “too little” rather than “too much” on one or both by a
margin of 87.1 percent to 2.4 percent — a ratio of over 36-to-1. But
all other groups of Americans held the same view, even conservative
Republicans — just not by the same overwhelming amount. They “only”
thought we were spending “too little” rather than “too much” by a margin
of 59.2 percent to 13.1 percent— a ratio of 4.5-to-1. With figures
like that — all well to the left of Democrats in D.C. — it’s no wonder
that conservatives in Congress always talk about “saving” Social
Security and Medicare, and forever try to get Democrats to take the lead
in proposing actual cuts.
One more thing: If you look at how much
liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans agree with one another —
regardless of the positions they take — you come up with figures for a
cross-ideological consensus. It’s the lower of the two percentages for
each position taken. The conventional narrative has liberals and
conservatives always, consistently taking opposite positions, but this
example clearly shows that’s not the case. If the conventional narrative
were true, the lower percentage for each position would be zero.
Instead, it comes to a margin of 59.2 percent to 2.4 percent, for a
ratio of 24.7-to-1.
Of course objections can be raised to these
results. For one thing, people are reminded that spending costs money,
but they are not being asked to
directly weigh spending more
money to paying more in taxes. When people are asked if they want more
government and higher taxes, or the opposite, results tend to be more
conservative. But there’s also evidence that people are generally more
willing to pay for government programs the more specifically they are
identified — even when they’re asked to consider the costs. Even
welfare, which is very unpopular in general, gains substantial support
when people are asked specific questions about specific people in
specific situations. (In a one-time GSS supplement in 1986, 98 percent
of all respondents indicated that welfare recipients should get more
money than they actually receive — author’s analysis of data in
“The Deserving Poor,” by Jeffry A. Will.) In short — it’s complicated.
Which
is why it’s best to take more than one approach. This brings us to the
budget-crafting poll I mentioned above—courtesy of researchers at the
Program for Public Consultation, a joint program of the Center on Policy
Attitudes, and the School of Public Policy at the University of
Maryland. In early 2011, PPC released the results of two waves of
“deliberative” polling bracketing the 2010 midterms, which swept a wave
of Tea Party Republicans into Congress, who in turn pushed for sharp
cuts in domestic spending with no tax increases as a matter of
principle. They presented their results in two reports, “
How the American Public Would Deal With the Budget Deficit” in February 2011, and “
Competing Budget Priorities: The Public, the House, the White House” the next month.
As
PPC noted in the second report, there is a decided lack of clarity from
standard polling about what the public wants: “When the public is asked
about the budget most people express their displeasure with the idea of
cutting spending in most areas, their displeasure with the idea of
raising taxes, as well their belief that it would be desirable to
balance the budget. This creates the impression that the public is
simply a mass of contradictory feelings.” To counter this, PPC created a
simplified budget process, meant to mimic the deliberative budget
process, particularly with its consideration of tradeoffs.
The
results of the process were extremely detailed, particularly compared to
what pollsters normally produce. But the big picture was strikingly
clear. Massive cuts to defense on the spending side, massive tax hikes
on the revenue side — both positions well to the left of the Obama
administration, as well as Democratic leaders in Congress. More
specifically, on the spending side, the public favored an average net
reduction of $135.3 billion for general defense spending ($109.4
billion), intelligence ($13.1 billion) and military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq ($12.8 billion), compared to increases proposed by
both President Obama and the GOP-dominated House.
This represented just over 92 percent of net spending cuts.
When you add in cuts to military aid and strategic economic aid to U.S.
allies, the total cuts involving what the pollsters described as
“spending on American international power” came to 96 percent of the
total — $139.4 billion. Yet, the public also supported modest increases
in several liberal priority areas: job training, education, energy
conservation and renewable energy, and pollution control. Their average
net reduction of all spending — $146 billion — was far more than either
the president or the GOP House proposed.
On the revenue side, the public increased taxes by an average of $292 billion—roughly
triple
the amount proposed by President Obama. Majorities increased taxes on
incomes over $100,000 by 5 percent or more, and by 10 percent or more
for incomes over $500,000. Majorities also increased corporate taxes and
other excise taxes. Overwhelming majorities also favored raising estate
taxes: 77 percent favored reverting at least to the 2009 levels, with
estates over $3.5 million taxed at a 45 percent rate. These positions
are generally so far left, they don’t even appear on the spectrum of
discussion in Washington.
The researchers also found broad
agreement across party lines. Their first report noted, “Among a total
of 31 areas, on average Republicans, Democrats and independents agreed
on 22 areas — that is, all three groups agreed on whether to cut,
increase or maintain funding. In 9 other areas there was dissensus.”
That’s not to say there weren’t differences. Republicans cut much less
from defense — $55.6 billion for core defense (versus $109.4 billion) —
and much less overall — $100.7 billion (versus $146 billion) — than
Americans as a whole. But even so, the position of Republican
respondents overall was still dramatically to the left of the political
conservation in Washington.
In fact, PPC noted:
It
is striking that no group — Republican, Democrat, or independents — on
average acted in ways that fit their respective media stereotypes. It
might be assumed that Republicans would cut the most; Democrats would
cut the least or even increase spending; and that independents would be
in between. But on the contrary:
- Republicans cut spending the least, though still considerably ($100.7 billion, or 7.4%)
- Democrats cut spending more than Republicans ($157.3 billion, or 11.6%)
- Independents cut spending substantially more than either Republicans or Democrats ($195.5 billion or 14.4%).
Thus,
everything
the media and Washington’s conventional wisdom tells you about the will
of the voters is wrong. But don’t forget the Tea Party! They, too, did
not respond as expected. Sure, they were more conservative than
Republicans overall, but they still come across as wild-eyed socialists
compared to their D.C. representatives:
Those who
described themselves as “very sympathetic” to the Tea Party (14% of the
full sample), as would be expected, raised taxes and revenues less than
Republicans in general, and less than Democrats and independents. Even
so, on average, Tea Party sympathizers found a quite substantial $188.2
billion in additional revenues to reduce the deficit ($105.2 billion in
individual income taxes).
Tea Partyers raising taxes?
By more than President Obama? Welcome to the strangest world of all:
Welcome to reality. Think I’m kidding? Then consider the next way that
PPC chose to look at its data — a comparison of blue and red
districts. Remember, these districts have become dramatically safer for
partisans than in years past — a fact that’s help push House
Republicans ever further to the right, because fear of a primary
challenge from the right is greater than fear of losing in the general
election. And yet, PPC found surprising little difference between red
and blue districts as a whole:
Overall, red districts
and blue districts were very similar in the ways that they increased
revenues…. What is surprising is that red districts on average increased
revenues slightly more than did blue districts on average.
On
average, red districts increased revenues by $295.5 billion, of which
$155.9 billion came from increases to individual income taxes. Blue
districts increased revenues by $286.4 billion, of which $153.6 billion
came from individual income taxes. In red districts, more respondents
increased effective tax rates on incomes over $500,000, as well as some
other taxes.
The reason for this counterintuitive
result, PPC notes, is the greater presence of independents in red
districts (25 percent vs. 19 percent in blue districts). Because they
favored higher taxes and deeper spending cuts, they tipped the balance
to make red districts remarkably similar to blue districts. The
differences were almost as modest on the spending side:
On
average, red districts made spending cuts totaling $140.6 billion,
while blue districts made cuts totaling $153.4 billion—a difference of
$12.8 billion.
The rational for the House of
Representatives is that it is “closer to the people,” and this is what
Tea Party political representatives have repeatedly claimed as well, as
they’ve fought to push the political spectrum sharply to the right.
Meanwhile, back in the real world, nothing could be further from the
truth. The main reasons are obvious: First, the independents who shift
the balance so decisively do not vote in GOP primaries, so their voices
simply don’t count. This is the point of the PPC’s red district/blue
district analysis. Second, and even more fundamentally, nobody ever asks
the public what they want in ways that allow them to articulate a
coherent vision. This is the point of PPC’s entire project, and their
budget project in particular.
It should be pointed out that
cutting the budget deficit much more than Democrats or Republicans does
not make the public more left-wing in one very crucial respect: Cutting
the deficit amounts to austerity economics, the opposite of the
Keynesian approach, which keeps deficits high when the economy is
struggling, letting public-spending demand take up the slack of missing
private sector demand, in order to hasten recovery. Classic Keynesian
policy calls for cutting back deficits only after economic recovery is
well established — a point we are still far from reaching roughly three
years after PPC’s surveys were conducted.
Yet, this doesn’t necessarily mean the public actually
believes
in austerity economics in the way that these figures might suggest, for
at least three main reasons. First, as Free and Cantril’s research
showed, Americans have always believed in austerity economics at a
symbolic, ideological level. This is what their findings about
American’s ideological conservativism were all about. But this finding —
based on surverys in 1964 — did not prevent LBJ from winning a
landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, and thus cannot be taken
seriously as a policy prescription. That’s what their findings of
operational liberalism are all about.
Second, there’s the
“the Beltway deficit feedback loop” described
by Washington Post Plum Line blogger Greg Sargent back in April 2011 —
the cumulative impact on public opinion of the Beltway deficit-cutting
obsession eventually stifling the public’s primary concern over jobs.
Thus, the public that PPC was polling around the 2010 midterms was a
public repeatedly primed to cut deficits
by Beltward Democrats as well as Republicans.
Third,
this priming was reinforced by the entire structure of the budget
exercise as designed by PPC. There was nothing in PPC’s approach
designed to ask if people preferred to prioritize putting people back to
work before reducing the budget deficit, or to provide accurate
information about the macroeconomics involved. This is not to say that
PPC is ignorant of this concern.
Another PPC survey
conducted in roughly the same time frame, just after the 2010 midterms
found widespread minformation throughout the elctorate, with some of the
most prominent examples having clear impact on people’s view of the
economy and economic policy. This includes underming their understanding
of how effective economic stimulus has been. But that’s a topic for a
whole other article.
We’ve just been through a lot of facts and
figures, but the bottom line boils down to this, an echo of what Free
and Cantil discoved back in 1967: The real polarization in Americcan
politics is a split between symbolic conservative intuitions on the one
hand, and pragmatic liberal facts on the other. The more that confusion
and unconfirmed, even unconscious biases abound, the more that
conservative “common sense” carries the day. The more informed that
people become, the closer they are to the problems that need solving,
the more liberal they become — no matter what they call themselves,
liberal, conservative, Tea Party or whatever.
Finally, it matters
just as little whether pollsters label them cozy centrists or wild
extremists. Sober facts bring us together. Unchecked fantasies drive us
apart. This should be our focus as we move toward trying to fashion a
way forward in the budget talks ahead. We need facts now, more than
ever, to get our country — and our government — working again.
Paul Rosenberg is a California-based writer/activist, senior
editor for Random Lengths News, and a columnist for Al Jazeera English.
Follow him on Twitter at @PaulHRosenberg.
What do you do when the Congressional Research Service, the
completely non-partisan arm of the Library of Congress that has been
advising Congress—and only Congress—on matters of policy and law for
nearly a century, produces a research study that
finds absolutely no correlation between the top tax rates and economic
growth, thereby destroying a key tenet of conservative economic theory?
